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Involuntary unemployment has been long recognized as one of the main negative fea-
tures of economic downturns and one of the main objectives of a stabilization economic
policy. Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) encouraged a literature that used search and match-
ing framework to explain determinants of unemployment and its cyclical movements (see
a comprehensive discussion in Gali, 2010). Search and matching framework when in-
corporated into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model significantly improves
its empirical performance (Gertler and Trigari, 2006). However, as Gali points out this
class of the literature does not focus on policy analysis.
On the other hand, in New Keynesian (NK) models (see review in Walsh, 2003, Wood-
ford, 2003 or Gali, 2008)that have been widely used for monetary policy analysis the
labor market is assumed Walrasian and frictionless. There in no unemployment in these
models and thus the role of labor market characteristics for the monetary policy cannot
be discussed.
This paper follows the literature that integrates search and matching frictions into a
NK model for monetary policy analysis. Thomas (2008), Blanchard and Gali (2009),
Faia (2008), Ravenna and Walsh (2009) and Tang(2010), among others, use NK models
with search frictions to address a Ramsey optimal policy. They find that an approx-
imated policy loss-function1 contains an additional term - labor market tightness gap.
Moreover, Faia (2008), Thomas (2008) and Tang (2010) found that in a model with
labor market frictions a simple monetary rule (Taylor, 1993) that reacts to movements
in unemployment or labor market tightness can increase welfare.
The natural question that arises is whether central banks respond to movement in
labor market characteristics in reality or whether they can improve welfare by starting
to closer monitor a labor market for their policy decisions.If central banks do react to
labor market dynamics then economic models should also incorporate this fact into the
description of the monetary policy. I argue that a standard Taylor rule in which nominal
interest rate solely responds to inflation and output gap is a too simplified description of
the real monetary policy design. For example, Curdia, Ferrero, Cee Ng and Tambalotti
(2011) empirically estimated fifty five different monetary policy rules and found the
1Loss function is obtained by linear-quadratic approximation as in Woodford (2003)
2
standard specification with to be the worst in terms of goodness of fit.
I address these questions in a NK model with an imperfect labor market of Tang
(2010). Using Bayesian techniques I estimated different versions of the model with
different augmented Taylor rules and conducted a welfare analysis. I use a Tang model
to be able to compare the welfare under my estimated rules with the Ramsey optimal
policy derived by Tang2.
Sala, Seoderstreom and Trigari (2008) also conducted similar estimation. They consid-
ered policy rules in which monetary authority responds to unemployment gap instead of
output gap and estimated the consequences of the parameter uncertainty. In contrast,
in my estimation I put an additional term for labor market into the Taylor rule as pre-
scribed by the theoretical literature. I calculate a welfare for the empirically estimated
Taylor rules and compere with the theoretically optimal ones from Faia (2008) and Tang
(2010).
My estimation suggests that augmented Taylor rules better describe the actual behav-
ior of central banks. I found a small positive coefficient in front of labor market tightness
gap, positive and rather large coefficient for employment and small negative coefficient
for unemployment when added separately. My posterior odds ratio test indicate that
models with augmented Taylor rules have a better goodness of fit than a model with
a standard Taylor rule. The rule with a highest marginal likelihood is the one which
targets inflation, employment gap and output gap. Using the Ramsey optimal policy
as a point of comparison I showed that models with augmented Taylor rule imply lower
welfare losses. The increase in welfare over the standard Taylor rule is up to 0.002% of
a steady state consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the
market equilibrium. Section 3 discusses social planner solution and optimal monetary
policy design. Section 4 presents the result of empirical estimation and welfare analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2The description of the Bayesian estimation can be found in An and Schorfheide (2007), Fernanandez-




In this section I briefly describe the model. Economy is populated by an infinitively
lived representative household with a continuum of members of measure unity. The
household maximizes the utility function (1) subject to a budget constraint and tran-
sition equation for labor. Household can change the consumption path by buying and
selling nominal government bonds Bnt or by sending additional household members to
work for a real wage wt. The process of finding a job is, however, subject to search
frictions on the labor market. All employed and unemployed household members have
perfect consumption insurance and ”share the table” within a family. Total labor force




βt−to [u(ct)− ntv(ht)−Bnt] (1)
ct is consumption goods, nt is a number of employed workers in period t, ht is a number
of hours worked per person, v is a disutility from working an extra hour and B denotes
fixed costs of working3. The constraints are








+ wtntht + utb− Tt +Dt (3)
At the beginning of period t unemployed worker finds a jobs with probability λt and
makes a match with a firm in the same period. At the end of the period workers are
separated with an exogenous probability d. Unemployed members get unemployment
benefit b from the government. Household also pays lump-sum tax Tt and gets profit Dt
from firms. Pt is a price of consumption goods, Rt is a gross nominal interest rate.








Ωnt = [wtht −
v(ht) +B
u′(ct)
+ Etβt,t+1[(1− d)Ωnt+1]− [b+ Etβt,t+1[(1− d)λtΩnt+1] (5)








When the household sends an additional family member to work it receives wage minus
disutility of labor and with probability (1−d), expected discounted value of employment
in the next period. At the same time the household loses the unemployment benefit and
future expected discounted value of potential employment λtΩ
n
t+1. Here βt,t+1 = β
u(ct+1)
u′(ct)
is a stochastic discount factor and Ωnt =
d(Ωt)/dn
u′(ct)
, is a value of employment (where Ωt is
a Bellman function for the household problem).
2.2 Producers
Large number of identical producers of intermediate good operate on a competitive
market. They use labor as the only input according to the production function (6)4.
Firms post vacancies vt at fixed costs χ in order to find workers. A vacancy meets an
unemployed person with probability µt and the match becomes operative in the same
period. At the end of the period share d of matches dissolves and the rest enters t+1
period according to 7.
f(ntht) = At(ntht)
1−φ, 0 ≤ φ < 1 (6)
nt+1 = (1− d)(nt + µtvt) (7)




′(ntht)ht − wtht + (1− d)Etβt,t+1Jt+1 (8)
χ = (1− d)µtEtβt,t+1Jt+1 (9)
The first equation states that the value of an additional worker for a firm equals to a
marginal product of labor times the real wholesale price pst minus wage and plus the
discounted value of additional worker in the next period Jt+1 if he does not lose the job.
The second arbitrage condition equalizes the cost of posting a vacancy to its potential
benefit - expected value of an additional worker. Combining both optimality conditions










4Technology follows log(At+1) = (1− ρA) log(ξ̄A) + ρA log(At) + εA,t+1, |ρA| < 1, εA,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2A)
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2.3 Labor market
Unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies randomly meet each other on the labor
market and matches are formed via the matching function (11) with a constant elasticity
of substitution ε and a constant return to scale.
m(ut, vt) = m[ξu
(ε−1)/ε
t + (1− ξ)v
(ε−1)/ε
t ]
ε/(ε−1) m > 0, ξ > 0, ε < 1 (11)
Althoug all workers are identical matching frictions prevent some workers from finding
a job. Search and matching process reflects the idea that worker needs to spend some
time on the job search. Thus unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies can coexist on
the market. Job-finding rate for a worker is determined as λt = m(ut, vt)/ut = m(1, θt)
and vacancy-filling rate µt = m(ut, vt)/vt = m(1/θt, 1), where µt = λt/θt. Variable
θt = vt/ut is called a labor market tightness.
The labor market in the model suffers from search externalities. λ(θt) is increasing
in θt since more vacancies relative to unemployed workers increases the probability of
finding a job - thick-market effect. And vice versa µ(θt) is decreasing in θ. A vacancy
is less likely to be filled when there are more vacancies and less unemployed workers
on the the market - congestion effect. Neither a single firm nor a single worker takes
these effects into account. As long as these externalities are not internalized the market
equilibrium is inefficient. Optimal policy thus has an incentive to respond to movements
of the labor market tightness in order to reduce the welfare losses from the search and
matching process.
2.4 Wage and hours bargaining
Wage is determined through a Nash bargaining. The firm and the worker in a match




(Ωwt − Ωut )ς(Jt − 0)1−ς
}
where ς is a worker bargaining power and 1 − ς is a bargaining power of the firm.
The surplus is then shared according to the worker’s and the firm’s bargaining powers
ςJt = (1− ς)Ωnt .
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All acceptable wage levels lie between the wage that brings a zero surplus for the worker
and the wage that creates a zero surplus for the firm. Because of vacancy costs these
two wages are not equal and therefore a non-trivial bargaining set exists (Gali, 2010).
Nash bargaining solution is one particular wage level from this set which is personally
efficient. Neither the worker nor the firm has an incentive to deviate from the Nash wage
(Hall, 2005).






The hours worked are chosen such that a marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure is equal to the marginal product of labor as in the framework
without labor market frictions. In other words the intensive margin is efficient despite
the distortions at extensive margin.











The wage splits the total created surplus according to the bargaining power of the
sides. The higher is a firm bargaining power (1 − ς) the closer is the wage bill to the
alternative costs of working for a household member - unemployment benefit plus saved
disutility of working. When the worker has a strong bargaining position a wage bill is
close to the firm’s benefit - marginal product of labor and saved vacancy posting costs.
2.5 Retailers
There are two types of retailers in the model. Intermediate retailers are indexed by
j ∈ [0, 1]. They buy intermediate goods from producers for price pst and convert them
into differentiated intermediate goods indexed by j. Intermediate retailers operate under
a monopolistic competition and set individual prices Pj. Prices are adjusted every period
with probability 1− α according to Calvo (1983).
Intermediate retailers sell their differentiated goods to a final goods retailer. He collects
a continuum of intermediate goods according to Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator (14) and
creates a final output (consumption basket) yt which is then sold to the household for
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a final price Pt. The three-stage-structure of production separates a matching process
on the labor market faced by producers from imperfect competition and price setting of
intermediate retailers.




























An intermediate retailer knows the demand for its goods yjt and decides on the price












































T−t(1− Φy)u′(cT )yT (PT/Pt)εp−1
(15)
where I used the definition of the stochastic discount factor, the fact that the optimal
price is the same for all intermediate retailers Pjt = P
∗





Φy is defined by 1−Φy = (1− τ)(εp− 1)/εp and can be seen as a measure of distortion
due to monopolistic competition. 1−Φy is a mark-up of an intermediate retailer adjusted
for the sales tax. When prices are flexible and there is no price dispersion the following
must hold: 1 − Φy = pst =
v(ht)/u′(ct)
f ′(ntht)
. In the model setup it is possible if either εp = 1,
meaning that intermediate goods are perfect substitutes and firms have no monopolistic
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power, or τ = 1 in which case the profits are fully expropriated by the government.
Thus the government is able to eliminate inefficiency from monopolistic competition if
it is able to impose an appropriate sales tax.
From Calvo pricing it follows that (1− α) share of firms change their prices in period
t and set it to P ∗t , while α of the firms leave the prices unadjusted. As in Calvo (1983)
the price index is Pt = [(1 − α)P ∗1−εpt + αP
1−εp
t−1 ]
1/(1−εp). Using this definition one can
obtain a standard Phillips curve




where πt = p̂t − p̂t−1 and every hat variable denotes a log-deviation from a steady
state level x̂t = log xt − log x. According to the Phillips curve the behavior of current
inflation is determined by expectations about future inflation and by real marginal costs
of production pst . It is important to note that producers encounter matching frictions
during the hiring process. As a result labor market distortions affect the marginal costs
and thus enter an aggregate supply dynamics through pst .
2.6 Government and Resource Constraint
Government budget is assumed to be balanced Ptutb = PtTt + τ
∫ 1
0
Ptjytjdj = PtTt +
τPtyt. Government bonds are in zero net supply in equilibrium. These two conditions
together with a household budget constraint and definition of the profit define the market
clearing condition for final goods (17). Defining a price dispersion measure ∆t the market
clearing conditions for intermediate goods market is (18).











dj = yt∆t (18)
In the baseline model central bank follows a Taylor rule (19), where εR,t is a monetary
policy shock. I consider different versions of the rule in the estimation later on.
R̂t = ρRRt−1 + (1− ρR)[ρππt + ρyŷ] + εR,t, εR,t ∼ N(0, σ2R) (19)
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3 Social Optimum and Optimal Policy
An efficient equilibrium in the model can be characterized as a social planner solu-
tion. Social planner chooses a path for {yt, nt, ht, vt}∞t0 to maximizes the utility of the
representative household subject to the transition equation for labor, the feasibility con-
straint on the intermediate goods market, the production technology and the resource

















s.t. nt+1 = (1− d)(nt +m(ut, vt)) (S̃t)∫ 1
0
yjtdj ≤ f(ntht) (
ˆ̃
λt)








which brings the following centralized versions of equilibrium conditions∫ 1
0










+ (1− d)(1− ηtλt)Etβt,t+1St+1 (23)





u denote derivatives of the matching function with respect
to vacancies and unemployment accordingly and ηt is an elasticity of the matching
function with respect to unemployment (see Appendix II).
Comparing (18) and (20) one can see that market equilibrium coincides with the social
planner solution if price dispersion ∆t is 1 in all periods. In other words prices must
be flexible and identical for all firms. (12) is equivalent to (20) if pst is 1 in all periods.
This implies that price of production is equal to the final price. In this case Φy = 0
and there is no distortions due to monopolistic competition on the intermediate goods
market. Conditions (9) and(22) are equivalent if Jt+1 = (1−ηt)St+1 which would happen
if firms would take into account an elasticity of matching function. Using this equality
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and substituting the values from (8), (23) and wage equation (13) one can show that the
labor market is efficient if unemployment benefit is zero and a worker bargaining power
is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment ηt = ς
in all periods (Hosios conditions, 1990). It means that a worker is fully compensated
through the wage for positive externalities that he creates for firms. It is also possible to
achieve an efficient allocation in a steady state by choosing an appropriate unemployment









If the government chooses a value of b such that Φθ = 0, then inefficiency due to search
externalities can be corrected 5.
To conclude, a fiscal policy can correct for search and monopolistic competition dis-
tortions in the steady state by an appropriate choice of sales tax and unemployment
benefit. In is naturally to suggest that monetary policy should focus on the last friction
in the model - imperfect price adjustment process. However, as Tang (2010) or Thomas
(2008) showed the loss function of the optimal monetary policy takes the form:




and θ̂∗ = qθnn̂t + qθAÂt is a measure of the labor market tightness gap.
Coefficients q are some functions of the structural parameters of the model.
As in a standard New-Keynesian model optimal policy endures losses from inflation
fluctuations (which arise from imperfect price adjustment) and losses from a non-zero
output gap. In this model the loss-function contains an additional term depending on
labor market tightness gap. In means that monetary policy needs to pay attention to a
labor market tightness and tray to keep it on some efficient level.
Note that search frictions and vacancy costs generate a deviation of output from its
efficient level and this is captured by the second term of the function. Additional term of
market tightness gap represents the distortions in composition of output (and therefore
consumption basket). Whenever labor market tightness gap is not zero a household sends
5If worker is undercompensated in a bargaining process he gets a positive unemployment benefit and
vice versa. As a result an economy-wide value of additional employed worker is the same as a value
of unemployed person
11
inefficient number of its members to search for a job (Ravenna, Walsch, 2009). Labor
market frictions create an additional policy trade-off between stabilizing inflation and
real activities which is not present when the labor market is efficient. The additional
term in the policy function can be seen as a ”cost-push” shock which makes ”divine
coincidence impossible”. Zero inflation is no longer optimal in this set up (see Faia,
2008, Thomas, 2008 and Benigno, Woodford, 2005 among others).
I log-linearized the model (presented in the Appendix I) and simulated it after a positive
technology shock to check that the model descriptive statistics are in line with the US
data. The model calibration and simulation results are resented in the Appendix III.
4 Simple Rules: Empirical Evidence
One important question that arises after the discussion in the previous chapter is
whether a central bank does react to labor market characteristics. John Taylor (1993)
was an author of simple monetary policy rules. He showed that the behavior of federal
funds rate in the US can be explained by the movements of inflation and output gap.
Federal funds rate responds to changes of output with a coefficient close to 0.5, and to the
changes in inflation rate with a coefficient larger then one, approximately 1.5. Strong
reaction to inflation represents a Taylor principle according to which a central bank
should respond to one percent increase in inflation by more than one percent increase in
nominal interest rate. As a result the real interest rate which is the difference between the
nominal rate and inflation increases and puts a downward pressure on inflation. Original
Taylor rule was based solely on empirical evidence. Taylor (1993) simply compared the
dynamics of the three described variables using graphs. Following his work a large
number of papers estimated this rule with various econometric techniques, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007), Curdia, Ferrero, Cee Ng and Tambalotti (2011), Judd and
Rudebush (1998), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), Cogley et al (2011) among others.
The Taylor rule appears to have a high goodness of fit. Moreover, the linear-quadratic
approximation of the policy loss-function (see Woodford, 2003) includes quadratic terms
of price inflation and of output gap. From the theoretical prospective a policy faces a
trade-off between price stabilization and GDP stabilization. The simple Taylor rule
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which includes measures of these two objectives is, therefore, well justified.
In a models with labor market imperfections the situation is different. Normative
analysis shows that including labor market variables in monetary policy rule can be
welfare improving. For example, Faia (2008) found that a Taylor rule which includes
inflation and unemployment gap R̂t = 2.1838πt + 0.15ût achieves the highest possible
welfare. Tang (2010) investigated simple rules augmented with a labor market tightness.
A simple rule with optimized coefficients R̂t = 2.1838πt + 0.00097θ̂t generates larger
volatility of inflation than the strong inflation targeting but lower volatility of labor
market tightness, employment and output. It thus outperforms the complete inflation
stabilization rule.
I suppose that simple rules are good approximation of actual behavior of central banks.
However, it is quite natural to think that there are many other variables that are omitted
in this equation. It is natural to think that monetary authority takes many economic
characteristics including labor market indicators into account when deciding on the
interest rate.
To shed some light on this question I estimate the model with three different versions
of a simple monetary rule. The rule was augmented with three labor market variables -
employment, unemployment or labor market tightness. I then access the magnitude of
the reaction to these labor market indicators. The search and matching inefficiency on
the labor market plays a crucial role for the analysis. In a standard new Keynesian model
with perfect labor market employment and output move one to one. Thus replacing
output gap with an employment gap in the Tylor rule makes a small difference. In the
considered model, on contrary, the labor market frictions break the link between output
and labor market characteristics. The model also has a labor market tightness explicitly
and allows to analyze its significance in the Taylor rule.
I use quarterly seasonally-adjusted data for the US for 1970Q1-2008Q4. My observables
are: 1) output - real GDP in 2009 dollars provided by Bureau of Economic Analysis;
2) inflation measured as CPI change, 2005=1, from OECD database; 3) unemployment
level data from Bureau of Labor Statistics; 4) Federal Funds Rate from Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louise database. All series (except inflation) were expressed as log deviations
from the HP-trend (HP smoothing parameter λ=1600).
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Estimation strategy based on Bayes formula (26), where p(Ψ|Y T ) is a posterior distri-
bution of parameters given data, L(Y T |Ψ) is a likelihood of the data and p(Ψ) is a prior
distribution.




The prior believes about parameter distributions are updated based on the observed
data. Parameter values which are more likely to lead to the observed data values receive
higher weights and vice versa low weights are assigned to unlikely parameters. State
variables are estimated with a Kalman filter (Stengel, 1994, for example) and the samples
from posterior distributions are obtained with Metropolis-Hastings sampler (Metropolis
et al., 1953, Hastings, 1970). I use 5 different chains with 25000 draws each. The scaling
parameter in a proposing distribution was adjusted such that an average acceptance
ratio is 0.3. Posterior analysis of chain convergence are presented in the Appendix IV.
I fixed some of the parameters at the calibrated values 6. Presumably, parameters that
characterize household behavior or price decisions by firms are better identified with
microdata which I do not use in the estimation.
For the parameters of the main interest - coefficients in Taylor rules - I specify loose
priors centered around standard values as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Smets
and Wouters (2007). For ρu I use a normal prior centered around zero. This prior
is motivated by the theoretical evidence. In Faia (2008) an optimized monetary rule
R̂t = 3πt + 0.15ût reacts positively to unemployment, while positive reaction to labor
market tightness in Tang (2010) R̂t = 2.18πt + 0.001θ̂t implies a negative response to
û. Sala, Seoderstreom and Trigari (2008) estimated a rule with unemployment gap and
found a negative response to unemployment: R̂t = 1.08R̂t−1 + 0.2πt − 0.14ût. The
normal prior allows for both positive and negative sign and stay agnostic on whether
the coefficient is distinguishable from zero. Priors for ρn and ρθ are the same as for
the coefficient in front of the output gap - Gamma distributions - but shifted closer to
the origin. I thus allow these coefficient to be very close to zero as in the theoretical
literature. Standard errors of the both shocks are assumed to follow inverse gamma
distribution with parameters 0.5, 4. All priors and estimation results are presented in
the Table (1) and plots for posterior distributions can be found in Appendix IV.
6Separation rate and Calvo parameter were adjusted to correspond to a quarterly data
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Table 1: Estimation results
Prior Posteriors
I II III IV
Basic dataset
ρR Beta (0.5,0.2) 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.91
[0.78; 0.85] [0.80; 0.87] [0.81;0.89] [0.88;0.94]
ρπ Gamma (1.5, 0.5) 1.70 1.92 1.75 2.5
[1.30; 2.07] [1.4; 2.4] [1.34; 2.14] [1.86;3.17]
ρy Gamma (0.25, 0.13) 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.12
[0.08; 0.29] [0.05; 0.29] [0.03; 0.24] [0.03;0.21]




ρu Normal (0, 0.13) -0.21
[-0.33; -0.09]
σA InvGamma (0.5, 4) 0.51 0.71 0.62 0.62
[0.46; 0.55] [0.65; 0.78] [0.56; 0.67] [0.56;0.67]
σR InvGamma (0.5, 4) 0.57 0.61 0.52 0.43
[0.52; 0.64] [0.54; 0.68] [0.44; 0.60] [0.36;0.49]
*Estimation of different model specification with one of the following Taylor rules: 1)
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1 − ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ] 2) R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1 − ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρθ θ̂t] 3)
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1 − ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρnn̂t] 4) R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1 − ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρuût].
Means and 90% confidence intervals are presented.
The estimation of the standard simple rule gives the following result
R̂t = 0.8R̂t−1 + (1− 0.8)[1.7π + 0.2ŷ] (27)
This estimated standard Taylor rule shows that monetary authority stabilizes inflation
and ”leans against the wind” by raising interest rate when the output is growing faster
than a target level. All parameter values are close to their conventional values and the
rule respects Taylor principle.
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Table 1 presents the results for the estimation of different Taylor rule specifications.
Column II shows the coefficients for the rule which additionally includes reaction to
deviations of the labor market tightness. The coefficient before inflation is close to the
the standard value. The coefficient in front of the output gap becomes smaller because
part of the movements of the interest rate is attributed to the reaction to the labor
market tightness. The coefficient for θ is positive and an order of magnitude smaller
than the rest of the coefficient in accordance with theoretical analysis. Tang (2010)
computed an optimal Taylor rule for the considered model given that the steady state is
efficient7 using a numerical optimization. The resulted Taylor rule R̂t = 2.18πt+ 0.001θ̂t
is associated with lower welfare losses than a complete inflation stabilization. In order to
increase a welfare central bank should react to labor market tightness with a coefficient
10−3 order of magnitude smaller that the coefficient for inflation. According to my
estimated rule the central bank responds to both output and labor market tightness.
The coefficient for the labor market tightness gap is one order of magnitude smaller that
the one for inflation.
An estimation of the the monetary rule specification with reaction to employment
deviations is presented in column III. Coefficient for output gap becomes smaller and
coefficient for employment gap is positive and large: 0.26. This rule indicates that mon-
etary authority responds stronger to employment gap than to the output gap. However,
the confidence interval for the coefficient in front of employment is rather wide and the
coefficient might be very close to zero.
The last column IV shows the coefficients for the specification with unemployment
gap. This rule is closer to the strong inflation targeting as the coefficient for inflation
increases to 2.5. Coefficient for unemployment is strongly negative: -0.21. Unemploy-
ment level can be seen as a separate goal in a policy rule. The results suggest that
reaction to unemployment fluctuations is as stronger that to output gap.8. To sum up,
the estimation suggests that monetary authorities target labor market characteristics
along the output gap.
7All market frictions are neutralized in a steady state by means of sales tax and unemployment benefit
8As a robustness check I included the data on vacancy posting index of The Conference Board and
recomputed all the results. For the alternative dataset the coefficient in front of unemployment is
smaller than the coefficient for the output gap. The rest of the results stays unaffected
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Table (2)presents posterior odds ratios for three different model specifications each with
a different augmented Taylor rule. Posterior odds ratio (28) shows a relative probability
of a particular model to be a true model. All specifications with augmented Taylor rules









L(Y T |Ψ, basic)p(Ψ|basic)dΨ
(28)
The first multiplier is a prior probability of a particular model to be the right one
relatively to a basic model (prior odds ratio). The second term is a ratio of marginal
data densities for corresponding models (Bayes factor). Prior odds ratio were set to 1
meaning that both model specifications are a priory equally probable.
In all cases models with augmented rules are more likely than a model with a standard
monetary rule (Table 2). The rules with unemployment gap or employment gap are
almost 25 times more likely to describe the true behavior of the central bank. Model
with the a Taylor rule augmented with labor market tightness is 21 times more likely
than a model with a standard rule.
Table 2: Posterior odds
Policy rule Log-Marginal Density Log Bayes factor
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρy)[ρππ + ρyŷ] -217.947 0
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρyŷ + ρθθ̂] -196.943 21.00
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρyŷ] + ρnn̂t -192.905 25.04
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρyŷ] + ρuût -192.896 25.05
Model with augmented rules are compared to the model with a standard rule with prior odds ratio
equal one.
Based on posterior odds ratio test one can conclude that a central bank indeed reacts
to changes in labor market characteristics. In a model with imperfect labor market an
augmented monetary rule improves the model’s goodness of fit.
Finally, using the loss function (30) I calculate welfare losses under an optimal policy
design and under different alternative monetary rules. Welfare losses are expressed as a











where c and y are steady state values of consumption and output respectively, W is a
consumption compensation in %. Result are shown in Table (3)
Table 3: Welfare loss
Rule L W in %
Ramsey Optimal policy 0.000298 0.000091
Strong inflation stabilization R̂t = 3π 0.00279 0.000856
Standard Taylor rule R̂t = 0.8R̂t−1 + (1− 0.8)[1.7π + 0.2ŷ] 0.023 0.0070
R̂t = 0.84R̂t−1 + (1− 0.84)[1.92π + 0.17ŷ + 0.025θ̂] 0.0210 0.0064
R̂t = 0.85R̂t−1 + (1− 0.85)[1.75π + 0.14ŷ + 0.26n̂] 0.0172 0.0053
R̂t = 0.91R̂t−1 + (1− 0.91)[2.5π + 0.12ŷ − 0.21û] 0.0256 0.0079
The rule augmented with an employment gap is the most welfare efficient and requires
a compensation 0.0053% of steady a state consumption. It is more optimal than a
standard Taylor rule specification which requires 0.007% of steady state consumption as
a compensation. However, strong inflation stabilization still appears to be much closer
to an optimal policy 9.
To conclude, the empirical analyses suggests that central bank’s behavior can be better
described by a monetary rule augmented with labor market indicators. Alternative
Taylor rules are also more efficient than a standard Taylor rule from a welfare prospective.
As a robustness check I ran Iskrev (2010) identification tests as well as plotted joint
draws from priors and posterior distributions. I must admit that identification of the
employment and unemployment parameters in the monetary rule is highly dependent
9Similar results can be found in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) who showed that as far as a cen-
tral bank strongly responds to inflation fluctuations and slightly to output gap the welfare losses
associated with a policy is almost indistinguishable from losses under an optimal policy
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on the calibrated parameter values for the labor market. Linear correlation coefficient
between filtered employment and output is 0.7 in the data. Therefore the model has
difficulties to identify coefficients on the output and employment simultaneously in a
fully estimated model. As a result I had to fix most of the values for the labor market
parameters. Non-linear estimation can help to overcome this issue.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to better understand the effect of labor market frictions
on the monetary policy design from theoretical and empirical prospective. I used a
NK model with search frictions on the labor market, imperfect price adjustment and
imperfect competition on the goods market. Inefficiency on a labor market resulted in an
additional trade-off for a policy maker who must choose between inflation stabilization,
closing output and stabilizing labor market tightness. Consequently, an optimal policy
has an incentive to give up a complete inflation stabilization in order to mitigate the
response of labor market variables to productivity shocks.
I study an empirical relevance of this additional trade-off for the central bank. I aug-
mented a monetary policy rule with different labor market indicators and estimated the
coefficients for this indicators with Bayesian technique. The estimation of the coefficients
in monetary policy rules suggests that monetary authority indeed react to labor market
variables. The coefficient for the labor market tightness is small but positive and coeffi-
cients for employment and unemployment gaps are the same order of magnitude as the
coefficient for the output gap. According to posterior odds ratio tests it is more likely
that central bank reacts to labor market indicators and a model with an augmented
Taylor rule thus better describes the reality. Such a behavior of a central bank was also
shown to be optimal from a welfare point of view.
These findings can be seen as an empirical contribution to the discussion about optimal
monetary policy and optimal simple rules. However, the model leaves a room for a richer
economic environment. The assumptions about exogenous separation rate or flexible
wages can be relaxed. I also abstract from capital accumulation in this paper and
assume a fiscal policy being able to eliminate all the distortions in equilibrium apart
19
from labor market frictions. Studying an extended version of the model with capital
accumulation is an interesting task for future research.
Moreover a non-linear estimation of simple monetary rules might help to overcome
the problems with poor identification and shed some light on the non-linear dependence
between labor market characteristics and the decision of monetary authorities.
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7.1 Appendix I Log-linearizion of the model
In this Appendix I present log-linearized model. In what follows the variables x̂t are
defined as log deviations from the steady state value, x̂t = log xt − log x.
1) Euler Equation
− σ̃−1(ln ct − ln c)− (lnPt − lnP ) ≈ (lnRt − lnR)− σ̃−1Et(ln ct+1 − ln c)− Et(lnPt+1 − lnP )
− σ̃−1ĉt − πt ≈ R̂t − σ̃−1Etĉt+1 − Etπt
2) Production function
Ât + (1− φ)(n̂t + ĥt) = ∆̂t + ŷt
3) Technology process









ŷt = scĉt + svv̂t
5) Beverage curve




where we define η = µ
′(θt)θ
µ




From the steady state relationship n = (1− d)(n+λu), dn = (1− d)λu, n = 1−d
d
λ(1−n)
Substituting in the equation above
n̂t ≈ (1− d)(1− λ)n̂t + d(1− η)θ̂t
6) Market tightness











[(ghγ+1 −B − bc−σ̃−1)ĥt + σ̃−1(ghγ+1 +B)ĉt]
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8) Job creation equations




[p̂st + Ât − φn̂t + (1− φ)ĥt]−
hw
J







p̂∗t − p̂t−1 = πt + (1− αβ)p̂st + αβ(p̂t+1 − p̂t)
πt = (1− α)(p̂∗t − p̂t−1)
which gives




11) Choice of hours
















ε [ξ + (1− ξ)θ ε−1ε ]
1
ε−1 so we can substitute it
and get λ̂t ≈ (mθλ )
ε−1
ε (1− ξ)θ̂t
13) Price dispersion measure

















− 1 = Πt − Π
7.2 Appendix II Elasticity of matching function
Let us define an elasticity of matching function ηt =
m′uut
m(ut,vt)
. Because of a constant
return to scale property one can write























7.3 Appendix III Model Calibration and simulation
The model is solved by first-order local approximation around deterministic efficient
steady state (see S. Schmitt-Grohe and M. Uribe, 2007). Time is measured in monthly
periods 10. All parameters are summarized in Table 4.
The discount factor is set 0.997 so the annual risk-free interest rate is about 4%.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ̃−1 is 0.6 which implies a high value for an
intertemporal elasticity σ̃ ≈ 6. As described in Rotemberg, Woodford (1997) when
consumer purchases contain both consumer goods and investment goods they are likely
to be more sensitive to interest rate. Since there is no explicit capital accumulation in
the model this high value of intertemporal elasticity is appropriate (see also Tang 2010).
Total hours worked are normalized to 1. The value for scaling factor in disutility from
labor Γ is then 0.74. A steady state level of unemployment is 6% which corresponds to
empirical value for US 11. Exogenous job-separation rate is d=0.028 as in Shimer (2005).
This brings a value for a job-finding rate in equilibrium 0.45 and implies the average
duration of working contract to be 2.9 years. This number is close to empirical evidence
that jobs last for two and a half years (Thomas, 2008). Inverse Frish elasticity is a little
bit controversial parameter because macroeconomic literature usually uses a higher value
than microeconomic evidence suggests. In the business cycles analysis this value varies
significantly as well. While Trigari (2009) and Gali (2010) set it to be equal to 5, for
example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) found the value 9.5 in their empirical studies
and Tang (2010) obtained 11.9 from a moment matching procedure. I choose a value of
11.96 for comparability reasons. Implied labor supply elasticity 1/γ is then 0.08 which
is on the lower bound of the interval proposed by microlevel evidence (Card, 1994, or
Altonji, 1986). At the same time, lower elasticity of labor (higher Frish elasticity) will
10Monthly data is supposed to better capture the employment dynamics and central banks are more
likely to use monthly data to develop monetary policy set-up (Thomas, 2008)
11All non-participating workers are counted as employed in the model
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lessen the reaction of labor to exogenous shocks which otherwise may become excessively
large in the absence of capital adjustment (Tang, 2010).
Labor output share (1 − φ) is 0.7 which is pretty standard. Unemployment benefit b
and sales tax τ are chosen such that in equilibrium both Φy and Φθ are equal to zero so
that monopolistic and labor market distortions are eliminated in a deterministic steady
state. ps=1 accordingly. Elasticity of substitution on production technology εp is equal
to 11 and the steady state mark-up is approximately 10% which is close to empirical
findings. Calvo parameter α=0.88 meaning that the probability of price adjustment is
12% and average price duration is 8 month as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and
Basu and Gottschalk (2009).
According to Hagedorn, Manovskii (2008) low worker bargaining power is needed to
account for only moderate procyclical movements of wages. Small reaction of wages
and low vacancy posting costs will create a strong response of firms to productivity
shocks and make labor market tightness more volatile than output. As in their stud-
ies and Shimer (2009) I set worker bargaining power ς=0.0532 and vacancy posting
costs to 0.0045 of the quarterly wage. GDP share of vacancy posting costs is therefore
sv=0.0014. I also set steady state value for θ equal to 0.634 as in these studies. As
a result the replacement ratio b
wh
is relatively high. Hagedorn, Manovskii argue that
workers include other compensations apart from unemployment benefits in the value of
non-market activities. Fixed costs of working B are adjusted accordingly.
Finally, for the matching function ξ = 1
2
which is consistent with an efficient steady
state and is often assumed in the literature (see Gali 2010). m̄ = (1/2)ε/(1−ε) as in Den
Haan et al (2000) and ε=0.435.
Table 5 presents the comparison of the empirical and simulated moments after a one
standard deviation positive technology shock.
The model reproduces the main important features of the data. Vacancies and labor
market tightness are more volatile than output, while employment, hours and wages are
less volatile. Employment and vacancies are positively correlated with an output while
unemployment has a negative correlation. Wage correlation with an output is stronger
than in the data due to the flexible wage assumption. Finally, the model is able to
capture a negative correlation between u and v - Beverage curve.
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Table 4: Parameter Values
β Discount factor 0.997
σ̃−1 Relative risk aversion 0.6
Γ Scaling factor in disutility of labor 0.74
d Job destruction 0.028
γ Frish elasticity of labor supply 11.96
τ Sales tax -0.1
b Unemployment benefit 0.12
ς Worker bargaining power 0.052
ε Elasticity of substitution in matching 0.435
η Elasticity of a worker-finding rate 0.356
sv GDP share of vacancy costs 1.4%
b/wh Replacement ratio 0.17
εp Elasticity of substitution in production 11
α Calvo parameter 0.88
B Fixed costs of working 0.53
χ Vacancy posting costs 0.35
h̄ Steady state value of hours 1
u Steady state level of unemployment 6%
θ Steady state market tightness 0.634
A Steady state technology level 1
y Steady state level of GDP 0.96
λ Job-finding rate 0.45
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Data Model















Correlation between u and v
-0.93 -0.14
Summary statistics calculated with US data for 1964-2006 (source: J-H Tang, 2010). All series were
logged and HP-filtered with λ = 1600.
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The model was simulated after a one-standard deviation positive technology shock
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Dynamics. Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation technology
shock
When worker productivity increases firms increase the demand for labor through both
extensive and intensive margin. Workers in turn increase the labor supply since the
wage also rises. Initial increase in labor market tightness slowly declines as firms find
workers though a matching process. Monetary authority tries to keep inflation at zero
level and increase a nominal interest rate.
Using the calibrated parameter values one can explicitly compute the parameters in
the loss function (30). It states that the largest losses occur due to inflation fluctuations.
As a result an optimal monetary policy focuses on the inflation stabilization. Modest
weigh is also assigned to an output gap and a small coefficient to a labor market tightness
gap. Woodford (2005) showed than if the coefficient before inflation and output in the
loss function are positive than a zero inflation policy minimizes the losses regardless
of shocks. In the current setup it is no longer the case. Additional channel for the
transmission of shocks via labor market creates an incentive for monetary policy to
31





t − ŷc∗t )2 + 0.012(θ̂t − θ̂∗t )2 (30)









































Figure 2: Comparison of Different Policy Regimes. Impulse responses to a positive one standard
deviation technology shock under: zero-inflation equilibrium (dashed line), social planner
solution (dotted line) and optimal policy (solid line)
Figure (2) presents the comparison of market equilibrium (solid line), social planner
solution (doted) and optimal monetary policy (dashed line). Social planner would keep
all the variables at the steady state levels and let an output to absorb the positive effect of
a technology shock. Under flexible price equilibrium deviations of employment, vacancies
and consequently labor market tightness are rather large. It can be explained by a low
bargaining power of workers. Since they are undercompensated for their participation
in labor market the level of vacancies relative to unemployed people is inefficiently high.
Not surprisingly, optimal policy, lies in between. It allows inflation do deviate from a
zero level in order to be able to stabilize employment, market tightness and output and
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to bring them closer to the efficient level. Complete inflation stabilization is no longer a
best possible solution as in the standard NK model 12.
7.4 Appendix IV Posterior analysis










































Figure 3: Posterior distributions for model with a simple rule R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 +(1−ρr)[ρππ+ρy ŷ+ρθ θ̂].
Priors are plotted with gray lines and posteriors with black solid lines. Dashed green lines
indicate the posterior mode.
12Policymaker would also allow for a high positive output gap in the first period and would then keep it
moderately negative in subsequent periods. The reason is that the labor market tightness response
to future output gaps is larger that to a current output gap. It is more beneficial to absorb the
whole effect of a technology shock in the first period in order to keep the future output gaps closer
to zero.
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Figure 4: MCMC univariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρθ θ̂].
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Figure 5: MCMC univariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρθ θ̂].
Figure 6: Miltivariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρθ θ̂].
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Figure 7: Posterior distributions for model with a simple rule R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 +(1−ρr)[ρππ+ρy ŷ+ρnn̂].
Priors are plotted with gray lines and posteriors with black solid lines. Dashed green lines
indicate the posterior mode.
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Figure 8: MCMC univariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρnn̂].
Figure 9: MCMC univariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρnn̂].
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Figure 10: Miltivariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρnn̂].
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Figure 11: Posterior distributions for model with a simple rule R̂t = ρrR̂t−1+(1−ρr)[ρππ+ρy ŷ+ρuû].
Priors are plotted with gray lines and posteriors with black solid lines. Dashed green lines
indicate the posterior mode.
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Figure 12: MCMC univariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρuû].
Figure 13: MCMC univariate convergence diagnostic for R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ρππ + ρy ŷ + ρuû].
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